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The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty
Andrew S. Gold*
Abstract: In the abstract, the limits on a lawyer's loyalty obligations could take
several forms. For example, constraints on a fiduciary's loyalty obligations may be
derived from a correct understanding of that fiduciary's loyalty itself. Indeed, viola-
tions might count as a form of disloyalty to the client. Alternatively, such con-
straints could stem from obligations owed to parties other than a lawyer's client,
or even something more abstract like the rule of law. Notably, such constraints
could be derived from legal principles that have nothing to do with fiduciary law.
Each of these options is a conceptual possibility, contingent on the choices made
by a given legal system. Constraints on a loyalty obligation that are implications
of that loyalty obligation itself are defined here as internal. Constraints imposed
from outside a given fiduciary loyalty obligation are defined as external. This paper
seeks to deepen our understanding of a particular type of fiduciary loyalty (the
loyalty owed by lawyers) by focusing on the role of such internal constraints, and
in the process to elaborate on the scope of loyalty obligations more generally. This
paper will also indicate why we should care about the internal/external distinction.
Among other things, this distinction helps determine whether lawyers are better
seen as private or public fiduciaries, and in practice it may bear on both judicial
reasoning and legal compliance.
Keywords: legal ethics, fiduciary loyalty, rule of law
I. Introduction
Fiduciary loyalty is often equated to an obligation to act in what the fiduciary
perceives to be her beneficiary's best interest. Yet, even where loyalty obligations
take a prescriptive form, they are rarely as simple as that. Some loyalty duties are
not owed to any determinate beneficiaries, and instead involve advancement of
an abstract purpose.1 Other loyalty duties are shaped by obligations to follow a
beneficiary's instructions, as occurs with agency relationships. Yet other loyalty
duties may be limited by obligations to obey positive law, even where doing so
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will curtail advancement of a beneficiary's best interests.2 These are only a few
examples, but they illustrate the degree of variation in fiduciary loyalty.
Whatever standard of loyalty applies, it may be subject to constraints. Such
limitations are a standard component of most types of loyalty, whether instanti-
ated in legal systems or in our daily lives. A less remarked upon feature of fidu-
ciary loyalty is that such constraints can be either external or internal. A loyalty
obligation may be constrained by the existence of another duty - such as a separ-
ate fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to an additional beneficiary, or a non-fiduciary
duty that limits the acceptable means of acting loyally-in which case the con-
straint is external.3 Or, alternatively, the constraint may be built into a particular
loyalty duty itself. For example, the limit imposed by an agent's duty of obedi-
ence may be understood as a component of a single loyalty duty owed to a par-
ticular beneficiary. In that case, the constraint is internal.
Do fiduciary principles require in general that constraints on loyalty obliga-
tions be internal or external? There is no evident reason to think that they do
(and the law provides examples of both types of constraint). The more interest-
ing question is whether particular internal constraints make sense, given legal
and extra-legal understandings of how loyalty works. In this article, I will pursue
the question whether certain constraints on fiduciary loyalty-notably those that
concern conformity to positive law or similar ethical obligations-are plausible
candidates for treatment as internal constraints. I will further consider whether
violation of such internal constraints could be a form of disloyalty. I will con-
clude that the answer is yes, but not in all cases.
While the nature of the constraints on a fiduciary's loyalty obligations has
bearing on a range of fiduciary relationships, they are especially salient in the set-
ting of lawyer-client relationships, and that setting will be the primary focus
here. Lawyers are often thought to owe fiduciary duties to their clients.4 Yet
lawyer-client relationships also implicate a number of basic constraints on the
pursuit of a client's best interests or even pursuit of her general objectives. These
include obligations of obedience to a client's instructions, and they include obli-
gations related to the proper functioning of the legal system and the rule of law.
Indeed, on a prominent view, the latter category may require a type of fiduciary
loyalty to the law itself.5
The central focus of this paper's argument is conceptual, but there are reasons
to care about the internal versus external question beyond obtaining conceptual
clarity. In part, this is because legal systems have options when they define fidu-
ciary loyalty obligations. Loyalty obligations are not necessarily moral
2 For discussion of how this prohibition can still count as a part of loyalty, see Andrew S. Gold,
"The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law," U. C Davis Law Review 43 (2009): 457-528.
3 While I use independent duties as an example, it is possible for external constraints to take
other forms. For example, a statute might curtail the scope of certain fiduciary duties without
making it a violation of duty for a fiduciary to exceed the limits set by that statute.
4 See W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2010), 38 (describing loyalty duties within the law governing lawyers).
5 Ibid., 122 (describing an obligation of fidelity to the law itself); ibid., 168: "[t]he lawyer-
client relationships should be structured by the ideal of fidelity to law, not to clients-that is, by
legal and ethical ideals of fiduciary obligations."
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obligations, and they are sensitive to social conventions and individual commit-
ments in a variety of ways.6 Legally defined loyalty duties may also diverge con-
siderably from loyalty duties as they exist outside the law.7 If in fact an internal
or external source of loyalty constraints is desirable, legal systems can deliberately
select one of these options.
Yet there are additional reasons to think the distinction matters. One possibil-
ity is that incorporating constraints on loyalty within a loyalty duty will affect
rates of compliance with that duty. Fiduciaries may view certain loyalty duties
differently from the other duties they owe, with consequent changes in conduct
when a constraint is built into those loyalties. Or, fiduciaries may show greater
concern about reputation effects if they are found to have violated a duty of loy-
alty than if they have violated another, external obligation (including another
type of fiduciary obligation).8 It may also turn out that fiduciaries that must bal-
ance loyalty obligations against external constraints will take those external con-
straints less seriously because they are not internal to the loyalty the fiduciary
owes. These hypotheses depend on empirical findings, but it is reasonable to sur-
mise that the distinction between internal and external constraints sometimes
matters for a fiduciary's behavior.
The above examples focus on the conduct of the fiduciary whose loyalty is
being defined (e.g., a lawyer with respect to her client), but our concern may in-
stead be with spillover effects in other pockets of fiduciary law outside the
lawyer-client setting. For example, it has a particular meaning when one person
is an agent of another, and a major part of that meaning is that the agent's cen-
tral concern is with advancement of the instructions and goals of her principal.
Lawyer-client relationships are also agency relationships. A lawyer-client relation-
ship with substantial external impositions on the lawyer's loyalty obligations may
send a signal that agency relationships in general involve similar external con-
straints on loyalty. This, in turn, might corrode the expressive effects and trust-
related benefits that attach to agency law more generally.
Furthermore, the internal versus external question may bear on the degree to
which the lawyer-client relationship is a private law institution, as opposed to a
public law institution. Some, such as Alice Woolley, recognize lawyer-client
6 For this reason, I am hesitant to draw close ties between the perspective adopted in this paper
and inclusive legal positivism. While an inclusive legal positivist might find much to agree with
in these pages-and there is a structural similarity between approaches-an inclusive legal positiv-
ist perspective is not necessary in order to adopt the arguments discussed here. I thank an an-
onymous reviewer for noting the structural parallel.
7 For several perspectives on this divergence, see Stephen A. Smith, "The Deed, Not the
Motive: Fiduciary Law Without Loyalty," in Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law, ed. Paul B.
Miller and Andrew S. Gold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Paul B. Miller, "The
Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty," in Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law, ed. D. Gordon Smith
and Andrew S. Gold (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018);
Andrew S. Gold, "Accommodating Loyalty," in Miller & Gold, Contract, Status, and Fiduciary
Law.
8 See Gold, "The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law," 524-25: "A legal opinion that
chastises a director for failing to keep a commitment, or for leading the corporation astray from




relationships as a private law institution with public law justifications.9 Others,
such as Evan Fox-Decent and Evan Criddle, see public law loyalty obligations as
regulating private law loyalty obligations in this setting.10 On their view, lawyers
are at least in part public fiduciaries.1 1 Does an external view on loyalty con-
straints bear on these views? Is it easier to see lawyer-client relationships as a pri-
vate law institution if the constraints on fiduciary loyalty to a client are internal
to that fiduciary loyalty? It may be that our views on regulation of lawyer-client
relationships will be shaped differently based on the sense that such relationships
are more or less public or private law institutions, and accordingly it may make
a difference how the internal/external question is answered.1 2
This paper's argument will unfold in several stages, showing how limits on a
lawyer's fiduciary loyalty can fit within an internal constraints structure should a
legal system so choose. Part II of this paper will consider the duty of obedience
common to all agency law relationships. This constraint readily fits within some
understandings of what it is to be loyal, not only from a legal perspective but
also extra-legally. On such views, it just is a part of loyalty to follow instructions,
and accordingly where loyalty is constrained by duties of obedience these are in-
ternal constraints. Part III will turn toward rule of law and similarly system-
oriented constraints on a lawyer's duty of loyalty. At first glance, this category is
more difficult to square with an internalist perspective, but both legal and extra-
legal examples of loyalty may incorporate constraints of this type as well. Part IV
will consider the degree to which a lawyer's objectives as a loyal fiduciary can dif-
fer from the aim of pursuing a beneficiary's best interests. Internal constraints
suggest that something other than best interests-centered loyalty will operate in
certain contexts. Thus, if internal constraints are part of fiduciary loyalty there
will be at least some divergence from a best interests-focused account of fiduciary
loyalty. This is not problematic, but it does pose a challenge for theories of fidu-
ciary law that presuppose a best interests standard of fiduciary conduct. Part V
will consider whether the internal/external distinction bears (or can bear) on ju-
dicial reasoning. As will be developed, internal constraints can potentially impli-
cate a distinctive pathway to legal outcomes, and this pathway may itself be
desirable. Part VI will then conclude.
9 Alice Woolley, "The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law
Relations," University of Toronto Law Journal65 (2015): 285-334.
10 See Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, "Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual
Commissions of Public Fiduciaries," in Fiduciary Government, ed. Evan J. Criddle, Evan Fox-
Decent, Paul B. Miller, Andrew S. Gold, and Sung Hui Kim (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2018), 71-75, 80 (indicating lawyers have second-order fiduciary duties to the public as a
whole and to the justice system). Their account also suggests another reason the difference may
matter: on their view, second order fiduciary duties must trump first order fiduciary duties. See
ibid., 81.
11 Ibid., 87.
12 Note also that the divide between public law and private law may be a dynamic one. See
Thomas W. Merrill, "Private and Public Law," in Oxford Handbook of the New Private Law, ed.
Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily L. Sherwin, and Henry E. Smith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2020).
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II. Loyalty and the Duty of Obedience
Perhaps the most basic example of an internal loyalty constraint emerges in
agency-type relationships. An agent's duty of obedience is understandable as a
loyalty obligation, and this includes the case of lawyers.13 Even if obedience is
just a constraint on loyalty (and not a loyalty obligation in its own right), it may
still be seen as an outgrowth of a certain conception of loyalty. Indeed, this possi-
bility implicates one of the most fundamental splits in loyalty categories within
fiduciary law. Trustee-type loyalty characteristically allows for paternalistic treat-
ment of a beneficiary whether or not a beneficiary agrees, while agency-type loy-
alty characteristically requires adherence to the expressed wishes of the
beneficiary. Agency-type loyalty involves internal constraints, at least to the ex-
tent such obedience is understood as an implication of the agent's distinctive
type of loyalty rather than an external imposition on the loyalty that agents owe.
Granted, the agent's duty of obedience does not have to be construed as a fi-
duciary loyalty duty. It might instead be a fiduciary duty of another type.14 But
obedience is sometimes seen as a loyalty duty,15 and that reading is entirely con-
sistent with commonly held extra-legal perspectives on the subject. As Simon
Keller notes: "If you are loyal to something, then you probably favor it, in one
way or another, in your actions. You might promote its interests, treat it with re-
spect or veneration, follow its orders, or act as its advocate."'6 Whether or not the
law in fact takes a lawyer's duty of obedience to be a component of loyalty, it is a
recognizable extension of existing loyalty concepts for the law to do so.
Importantly, loyalty constrained by internal duties of obedience need not be a
less stringent form of loyalty, or a diluted version. It can be a different form of
loyalty. Acting obediently may preclude some conduct that would advance a ben-
eficiary's best interests, but those acts of obedience can still be examples of loy-
alty to that same beneficiary. Attempting to comply with a principal's
instructions may also be just as demanding as attempting to advance a principal's
best interests. And, from a principal's perspective, a failure to conform to his or
her instructions may be a greater betrayal than a failure to advance his or her
best interests. There is no deep conceptual challenge in recognizing an
obedience-based constraint as a component of a fiduciary's loyalty rather than an
exception to that loyalty or a carve-out from its requirements, nor does recogni-
tion of such constraints require watering down of fiduciary loyalty obligations.
13 On the importance of the agency law component, see Deborah A. DeMott, "The Lawyer as
Agent," Fordham Law Review 67 (1998): 301-26.
14 See Rob Atkinson, "Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty," Journal of Corporation
Law 34 (2008): 47-48. It also bears noting that the Restatement (Third) ofAgency has separate sec-
tions covering obedience and conventional loyalty duties.
15 See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, "Yours, Mine, and Ours: Law Firm Property Disputes,"
Northern Illinois University Law Review 30 (2009): 26: "Agents owe a duty of obedience as an as-
pect of their duty of loyalty, and they are accordingly bound to follow their principals' lawful
instructions."




Correctly understanding some forms of loyalty means observing that these
forms of loyalty include duties of obedience. These internal features are nonethe-
less also constraints on an otherwise robust obligation to act in the best interests
of a beneficiary or to act in a way that advances her comprehensive goals in life.
Whether we speak of fiduciary law, friendships, or other loyal relationships,
duties of obedience may take the form of internal constraints.
III. Loyalty, Internal Constraints, and the Rule of Law
Rule of law and similar limits on loyalty are more visibly detached from a law-
yer's advancement of her client's interests. Accordingly, they are a more difficult
explanatory challenge. Initially, these limits may seem like natural candidates for
treatment as external side constraints on loyal conduct. Such limits on loyalty
may, however, be interpreted in a variety of ways, and among these possibilities
is an internal constraints understanding.
A. Internal Constraints as a Potential Interpretation
The idea that these limits on lawyer conduct are merely side constraints has been
subject to criticism. For example, in a draft paper, Bradley Wendel has suggested
that lawyers owe a loyalty duty to the law, with the effect that lawyers are like
agents empowered by two principals (with loyalty owed to both their client and
the law). 17 An advantage to this suggested perspective is that it allows for lawyers
to be subject to limits on the scope of their loyalty while also recognizing that
such limits are a source of the lawyer's power.18 This argument thus captures
something important about the way we conceptualize the constraints on lawyers'
fiduciary conduct.
Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that fiduciary loyalty could be owed to the
law. There is nothing in fiduciary law to preclude loyalty obligations to advance
goals or purposes.19 Charitable purpose trusts are a prime example, but we may
also understand a lawyer's obligation to conform to the law-or for that matter
a judge's obligation to do so - as a fiduciary loyalty obligation that is not owed
to any particular beneficiary. We might also see fiduciaries as parties that owe
their obligations to multiple beneficiaries; such relationships are common, as
multiple beneficiary relationships arise quite frequently in corporate law set-
tings.20 For that matter, it is not rare to see hybrid relationships that incorporate
17 See W. Bradley Wendel, "Should Lawyers Be Loyal To Clients, The Law, or Both?," (unpub-
lished manuscript).
18 Ibid., 19. Criddle and Fox-Decent, "Guardians of Legal Order," 80, likewise seek to avoid
seeing these constraints as mere side constraints.
19 These are fiduciary governance cases, as described in Miller & Gold, "Fiduciary Governance."
20 On the significance of multiple beneficiary cases in fiduciary law, see Evan Fox-Decent,
Sovereignty's Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Paul B.
Miller, "Multiple Loyalties and the Conflicted Fiduciary," Queen't Law Journal 40 (2014): 301-
40; Andrew S. Gold, "Reflections on the State as Fiduciary," University of Toronto Law Journal 63
(2013): 655-70.
70
The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty
fiduciary duties to determinate beneficiaries as well as fiduciary duties to advance
abstract purposes. Public benefit corporations are a prominent hybrid example,
and lawyer-client relationships may be another one.2 1
Still, there is an alternative path, for Wendel's suggested interpretation is not
the only option that avoids treating rule of law or similar limits on attorney con-
duct as mere external side constraints. We do not have to see lawyers as agents to
two principals (or, as Criddle and Fox-Decent put it, as fiduciaries with dual
commissions) in order to avoid the mere side constraint reading.22 It is also pos-
sible to think that lawyers possess loyalty obligations that require respect for the
law-and for the rule of law-that are incorporated into a single agency rela-
tionship, or into a single fiduciary commission. These limits do not have to re-
sult from relationships with two principals, nor from dual commissions.
Fiduciary loyalty allows for the possibility of internal constraints incorporated
within a single loyalty to a specific beneficiary.
It may nonetheless be counterintuitive to recognize such constraints as internal
in this sphere. If there are legal limits on a lawyer's loyalty to her client based on
the rule of law or even based on the strictures of impartial morality, mustn't they
come from other legal relationships external to the lawyer-client relationship? I
do not wish to downplay the possibility of tensions between loyalty to a client
and loyalty to the law, as that potential is quite real.2 3 Nor should we ignore the
importance of external constraints on loyalty when legal systems adopt a set of
rules that govern lawyers. Even so, internal limits on loyalty may exist, and may
even include a mandate to comply with positive law or to act ethically. Internal
constraints may arise if a legal system makes that choice just as readily as external
constraints may do so. Fiduciary law concepts are open-ended enough to allow
for either possibility (or for both possibilities simultaneously).
Nor is this an entirely untried option. Significantly, in some settings fiduciary
law does make use of internal loyalty constraints to ensure that fiduciary loyalty
not undermine the rule of law or otherwise demonstrate an overtly disrespectful
perspective toward the law. Internal limits on loyalty are already a feature of
existing fiduciary law in these settings. Indeed, violations of such internal con-
straints may qualify as a type of disloyalty in their own right. A prominent ex-
ample is the prohibition against corporate directors intentionally violating
positive law. Here, what appears to be a systemic goal of advancing legal compli-
ance and rule of law values is subsumed within a director's loyalty obligations,
and these loyalty obligations are owed to her corporation itself.
21 See Andrew S. Gold and Paul B. Miller, "Fiduciary Duties in Social Enterprise," in
Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law, ed. Benjamin Means and Joseph W. Yockey (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
22 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, "Guardians of Legal Order," 70 (describing a dual commissions
view).
23 See John Gardner, "The Twilight of Legality," Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy 43
(2018): 15-16 (indicating a potential for conflict between a lawyer's role as a representative of a
client's interests and a responsibility for upholding the rule of law).
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B. Internal Constraints, Commitments, and Moral Limits
As suggested above, the corporate context is interesting for an additional reason,
as it suggests something more than just the existence of internal constraints. The
internal constraints at issue in the corporate context are not merely constraints;
their violation is a form of disloyalty. For example, in Delaware, shareholder
plaintiffs can successfully sue directors for breaches of loyalty when those direc-
tors have purposely caused the corporation to violate positive law. And, this re-
sult is not couched in terms of public policy but rather in terms of what
directors owe as fiduciaries to the corporation and its shareholders. The legal
understanding is that the directors have acted disloyally to the corporation by
means of their choice to have the corporation act illegally.24 This admittedly
leaves us with the question of how courts can reach this conclusion without dis-
torting conceptions of loyalty as it is usually understood. But the legal point of
view that this is disloyalty to the corporation is well established.
How can there be a loyalty breach in cases where directors believe that violat-
ing positive law would cause the corporation to benefit financially? An answer
lies with the fiduciary duty of good faith (which is itself a subpart of loyalty). It
is a breach of fiduciary good faith to betray a commitment the directors have
made to the corporation, and one of those commitments is to follow the terms
of the corporation's charter. In turn, the terms of the corporation's charter are
understood to incorporate positive law among their requirements. By extension,
intentionally violating positive law means intentionally violating the corpora-
tion's charter.25 And this, it follows, means that intentionally violating positive
law is betraying the corporation and acting disloyally toward it. We have a recog-
nizable loyalty breach in such cases, and it involves a constraint on loyalty that is
internal to the loyalty that directors owe to their corporation.
The case of the lawyer may seem different, for even if we accept that loyalty
to the corporation means not violating the corporation's charter-and that this
means not intentionally violating positive law-no similar relationship exists for
the lawyer. A lawyer-client relationship does not come with a charter that the
lawyer can violate with the consequent effect of betraying her client by violating
positive law. Moreover, we might wonder if the Delaware courts haven't
stretched fiduciary loyalty concepts to the breaking point, even in corporate con-
texts where charters are a component of the parties' relation.
24 This is made clear in the Disney case, which explicitly describes violations of positive law as fi-
duciary bad faith, and in Stone v. Ritter, which makes clear that fiduciary bad faith is a type of fi-
duciary disloyalty. See In re Walt Disney Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); Stone v.
Ritter, 902 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2007).
25 The view that such breaches are a form of disloyalty to the corporation is developed in then-
Vice Chancellor Strine's jurisprudence. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del.Ch.
2006); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del.Ch. 2007). For further discussion of the
concepts of loyalty involved and how they can be rendered coherent, see Gold, "The New
Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law,"475-477.
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Yet this reading should not surprise us, for being true to commitments is one
of the classic ways of demonstrating loyalty.26 If the notion of being true to com-
mitments underpins these constraints on director loyalty duties, the loyalty
involved is well within the mainstream of loyalty conceptions. Furthermore,
even in the absence of commitments like those found in a corporation's charter,
there is a non-legal basis for thinking that loyalty can incorporate constraints
that require conformity to positive law or to ethical rules. It is possible to see a
lawyer's obligations to act consistently with the law (or even the rule of law) as
internal constraints on loyalty in a way that broadly tracks common understand-
ings of how extra-legal loyalty can be constrained. For example, Tim Scanlon's
analysis of the obligations in friendships is suggestive of an internally constrained
loyalty obligation that is itself sensitive to moral obligations.
In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon worries that a certain kind of
"amoralist" individual "could be immune to the claims of strangers while still
enjoying friendship and the goods of other relations with specific individuals."27
Scanlon's concern is that some may object to his contractualist account of moral-
ity on the grounds that it does not leave enough room for friendships that we
have reason to value. In response, he suggests that the obligations of friendship
may actually incorporate the need for moral justification to other parties.
As Scanlon argues:
Friendship ... involves recognizing the friend as a separate person with moral standing-
as someone to whom justification is owed in his or her own right, not merely in virtue of
being a friend. A person who saw only friends as having this status would therefore not
have friends in the sense I am describing: their moral standing would be too dependent
on the contingent fact of this affection. There would, for example, be something unnerv-
ing about a "friend" who would steal a kidney for you if you needed one.28
True, there are things we owe to friends that we do not owe to others. But, as
Scanlon indicates: "what the kidney example brings out is that friendship also
requires us to recognize our friends as having moral standing as persons, inde-
pendent of our friendship, which also places limits on our behavior."2 9
Importantly for our purposes, the upshot of this understanding is that friend-
ship will not be downgraded by recognizing such internal limits on the appropri-
ate behavior of friends. As Scanlon emphasizes: "If ... the conception of
friendship that we understand and have reason to value involves recognizing the
moral claims of friends qua persons, hence the moral claims of nonfriends as
well, then no sacrifice of friendship is involved when I refuse to violate the rights
26 See Keller, The Limits of Loyalty, 154 (discussing the idea of being loyal in terms of being
true); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 354: "All so-
cial forms involve ways of being true to the project or to the relationship which they define.";
Gold, "The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law,"489-92; Matthew Harding,
"Disgorgement of Profit and Fiduciary Loyalty," in Equitable Compensation and Disgorgement of
Profit, ed. Simone Degeling and Jason N.E. Varuhas (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 21.
27 See T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1998), 164.
28 See ibid.
29 See ibid., 165.
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of strangers in order to help my friend." 30 As Scanlon also notes: "this is not a
watered-down version of friendship in which the claims of friends have been
scaled back simply to meet the demands of strangers."3'
I take this to be an implicit argument for a kind of loyalty that incorporates a
constraint barring at least some immoral behavior. If we accept his argument,
when Scanlon says "no sacrifice of friendship is involved," we might as readily
say that no sacrifice of loyalty is involved. The loyalty obligations of friends may
incorporate internal constraints such that loyal behavior is not understood to re-
quire certain immoral conduct toward other individuals. And, whether or not all
friendship looks that way-Scanlon is ready to concede that the friendship be-
tween Achilles and Patroclus might be different32-it is reasonable to think that
mainstream examples of friendship include loyalty that incorporates moral
limits. 33
None of this is to say that friends are fiduciaries, or that lawyers are best
thought of as being like friends.3 4 I have serious doubts about both views, as do
others. It is nonetheless valuable to draw on friendship-based conceptions of loy-
alty to better understand fiduciary loyalties, and occasionally it is useful in order
to better understand the loyalties specific to lawyer-client relationships. This is
one of those occasions. What Scanlon's example suggests is that some types of
loyalty may incorporate moral constraints on pursuit of a beneficiary's best inter-
ests. This is not a far cry (structurally at least) from a fiduciary loyalty that incor-
porates rule of law constraints. While the content and setting differ, there is
room for internal constraints on loyalty based on commitments (as demonstrated
by the corporate law setting), and based on morality (as demonstrated by the
friendship setting). A rule of law-based constraint is different in content, but it is
not significantly different in type. The lawyer-client relationship is a unique fidu-
ciary relation, and it may have unique internal constraints in light of that
relationship.
C. The Betrayal Objection
At this point, there is a potential objection. Recall that in the corporate setting
internal constraints are not only constraints, they are joined by loyalty obliga-
tions. While internal constraints are not loyalty obligations as such, at least in
some cases courts treat their violation as a type of disloyalty. This is the result in
Delaware corporate law when directors intentionally cause their corporation to
violate positive law. The intentional violation is viewed as a form of disloyalty to




33 Cf. Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, 136 (discussing the view that lawyer-client conversa-
tions that track friendship norms will need to deal with moral issues in the way that friends deal
with moral issues).
34 But cf. Ethan J. Leib, "Friends as Fiduciaries," Washington University Law Review 86 (2008):
665-732; Charles Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship," Yale Law Journal 85 (1976):1060-89.
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constraints as disloyalty? For some, the notion that this conduct is a kind of dis-
loyalty will be counterintuitive.
The concern may be linked to the reactive attitudes that are characteristic
responses in cases of breached loyalty obligations. Note that disloyalty is often
understood to be more than just a wrong; it is understood to be a betrayal, and
victims of disloyalty tend to feel betrayed.3 5 I have suggested that internal con-
straints can be partly constitutive of a fiduciary's loyalty, such that breaches of in-
ternal constraints will sometimes be a form of disloyalty. With this reading in
mind, we should consider not only how parties subject to loyalty obligations ex-
perience a purported internal constraint, but also how beneficiaries experience a
breach of such a constraint. Would a client who understood that her lawyer
broke the law or otherwise acted unethically on her behalf see this conduct as a
betrayal? The client might very well be disappointed, upset, or regretful-par-
ticularly if she feels somehow complicit-but would she think her lawyer had
betrayed her?
The skeptic's concern then is that breaches of internal constraints are not al-
ways experienced as betrayals by their victims (especially if the victim is better
off as a result of the breach), and accordingly that these constraints are not best
conceptualized as a form of disloyalty. For example, a client will not necessarily
feel betrayed by a lawyer who undermines the rule of law on her behalf, if in fact
this conduct works to the client's benefit. Arguably, if feeling betrayed is not an
apt reactive attitude in such contexts, then a breach of an internal constraint is
not best understood as a disloyal act. I will refer to this objection as the
"betrayal" objection. Several responses are available, some of which are more
compelling than others.
Before proceeding with these responses, however, some caveats are in order.
To the extent our goal is to understand how a fiduciary's beneficiaries will react
to a breach of internal constraints, this raises empirical questions. Understanding
how beneficiaries perceive a loyal party's conduct may require social psychology
research beyond the scope of this paper. Context is also significant, as different
relationships implicate different loyalty types. Indeed, constraints on loyalty can
qualify as internal constraints even if their breach is not a form of disloyalty.
Only a subset of legally recognized internal constraints may implicate loyalty
obligations when a fiduciary exceeds their limits. Suppose, however, that we con-
sider a case in which a legal system does claim that violating an internal con-
straint is a form of disloyalty (as occurs in Delaware corporate law). Is that claim
a plausible one?
First, note that some internal constraints on loyalty do implicate a sense of be-
trayal when they are breached-and this occurs even outside the law. A classic
example is when a recipient of loyalty expects obedient, agency-type loyalty and
instead receives paternalistic, trust-type loyalty. The resulting sense of betrayal is
well-represented in literature and in life. If we reasonably expect a person to
35 See, e.g., Keller, The Limits of Loyalty, 200: "Disloyalty appears to be a distinctive and pro-
found kind of wrong, and the ideas with which it is associated-ideas of letting someone down,
betrayal, abandonment, treason and treachery-are highly morally charged."
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follow our instructions-because they are a loyal friend or a loyal employee-
and that person ignores those instructions, this is often seen as a betrayal. In
such cases, the sense of betrayal may exist even if we are better off as a result of
the disobedience. Not all loyal relationships implicate such agency-type loyalty,
but some do. Thus, at least to the extent this kind of internal constraint is at
issue, a betrayal reaction in cases of breach is plausible.
Indeed, some instances that implicate a feeling of betrayal are closer to ethical
or rule-of-law-type constraints. Imagine a case in which parents paid off a school
administrator to give their daughter an advantage on a test during the grading
process. If she received an "A" and subsequently learned what happened, she
very well might feel betrayed by her parents (let alone the school administra-
tor).3 6 Indeed, she might feel betrayed even if her parents thought they were act-
ing in her best interests, and even if it turned out she were overall better off. As
a beneficiary of her parents' loyalty, she might think that they owed her loyal
conduct pursued in the right way, and that it actually betrays her to help her ad-
vance in the wrong way.
Another response is to shift the analysis from breach cases to compliance cases.
Perhaps the better question to ask is whether a beneficiary would feel a sense of
betrayal if the loyalty-owing party fails to break the law or act unethically. How
would a beneficiary react if her friend didn't steal for her? Perhaps she would say:
"You didn't steal for me? You're not a true friend!" 37 But perhaps instead she
would be glad to hear that no theft had occurred, and she would understand
that friendship's loyalty is constrained by morality. The difficulty with shifting
the question in this fashion, however, is that it doesn't suggest the precise phe-
nomenon we need to see. It suggests that there may not be a loyalty breach
where internal constraints are followed, but it fails to show that an internal con-
straint has the right features such that non-compliance is a betrayal.
Here is a further conjecture: perhaps not all kinds of disloyalty register emo-
tionally as betrayals, even when a beneficiary recognizes (or is capable of recog-
nizing) that a betrayal exists. There may be cases where people can see that
another person has technically betrayed them if they ponder the matter, yet not
feel the classic emotional responses because any such feelings are swamped by ap-
preciation for what was done by the loyalty-owing party, or by other considera-
tions that are more important to the beneficiary than the loyalty at issue.3 8 In
the right circumstances, one might feel relief that a promise was broken, or glad-
ness that a relationship was betrayed.3 9 By the same token, one might feel indif-
ferent. Recognition that a wrong has occurred in these cases is separable from
36 I thank Ben Zipursky for suggesting a variation on this hypothetical.
37 I thank Brad Wendel for this suggestion.
38 Indeed, the central case of fiduciary disloyalty is the conflicts of interest case. Here, too, a be-
trayal reaction may be hit or miss. Cf. In re Will of Gleeson, 124 N.E.2d 624 (Ill.App.Ct. 1955)
(a case involving a conflict-based loyalty breach that was apparently both a product of good faith
and in the best interests of the beneficiary).
39 For the idea that a betrayal can be a part of how we look out for someone's best interests, see
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 354: "Many a soap opera has capitalized on the idea of the lover
who is disloyal in order to break the relationship because he realizes, correctly, that this is in the
best interest of the loved one."
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the standard reactive attitudes. Similarly, if a fiduciary breaks a law on a benefi-
ciary's behalf, she might not feel the classic emotions that go with a betrayal, yet
she could still perceive that a betrayal occurred upon considering the matter.
Lastly, one might respond by returning to the law and the way it is expressed
in legal opinions. It is a fact that some internal constraints are understood by the
courts to implicate affirmative loyalty duties. As indicated, this is true for inten-
tional violations of the law in the corporate setting. Even if the parties them-
selves do not experience the standard reactions associated with betrayals in these
contexts, the courts take the relevant constraints to implicate loyalty duties (and
from the perspective of the law, their violation is a type of disloyalty). Courts are
free to adopt such conceptions in other areas beyond the corporate sphere-such
as the lawyer-client relationship-whether or not the courts' perspective on loy-
alty is internalized by real-world fiduciaries and their beneficiaries. Fiduciary law
often adopts stylized conceptions of loyalty,4 0 and this context may simply be
another instance.
D. Summary
As a conceptual matter, it is feasible to recognize loyalty obligations for lawyers
and for other fiduciaries that incorporate at least some rule of law or system-
oriented constraints on how that loyalty is carried out. Such constraints can be
internal to the loyalty at issue. It is also possible to see violations of these con-
straints as types of disloyalty, although this latter view is not entailed by the ex-
istence of internal constraints. Notably, constraints that require conformity to
positive law are already recognized as internal constraints within corporate law,
and roughly analogous constraints appear in extra-legal loyalty-focused relation-
ships like friendships. A lawyer's loyalty may not presently reflect an internal
constraints perspective, but it could reflect one without having to diverge signifi-
cantly from recognizable forms of loyalty within the law. Likewise, such an ap-
proach could fit well with recognizable forms of loyalty outside the law.
IV. Relevance for the Best Interests Standard
It is one thing to say that a fiduciary's obligation to pursue another's best inter-
ests is constrained by the existence of external obligations, and quite a different
thing to say that a fiduciary's loyalty may itself require something different from,
or less than, pursuit of a beneficiary's best interests. For those attracted to the
idea that fiduciary loyalty necessarily means advancement of a beneficiary's best
interests (or advancement of what the fiduciary perceives those best interests to
be), the idea of an internally constrained fiduciary loyalty may seem
40 For a strong version of this claim, see Smith, "The Deed not the Motive," 213, 214-15 (ques-
tioning whether fiduciary loyalty is truly a loyalty duty in light of loyalty's temporal features and
its requirement of the right kind of motive).
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problematic.4 ' An analogous concern arises for extra-legal loyalty, which some
may see in similar terms. Yet these worries are not justified if we focus on loyalty
practices in common law jurisdictions, let alone in extra-legal settings. Non-best-
interests loyalties are commonplace, and they may even be more abundant than
best interests versions.42
Let us turn first to lawyer-client relationships. Notice that, at the level of a
lawyer's loyalty obligation, the obligation may not be directly concerned with
best interests, or at least not under several common understandings of that obli-
gation. For example, consider the idea that lawyers' loyalty obligation means that
they should advance their clients' goals. Not only may those goals be subpar
from a societal perspective or from a moral perspective, they may not actually be
in the client's best interests. Or, consider the view that lawyers should act so that
clients are enabled to use the legal system to advance their goals.43 The effect is
similar, for once again a client's best interests may rapidly diverge from what the
client is enabled to seek.
Notice also that the concerns here go beyond the issue of complying with a
client's instructions. Alice Woolley notes that lawyers have a duty "to avoid
usurping a client's decision making."44 "A lawyer has, that is, a duty to avoid a
client's epistemic dependence and to seek to understand deeply and empathically
the client's own perspective."45 This understanding suggests a picture of loyalty
related to preservation of a client's perspective, and it means more than following
instructions. The obligation bears on behavior that will impact what those
instructions will turn out to be. This account can readily be seen in loyalty
terms, and it is unclear why advancement of a client's perspective would coincide
in all cases with a client's best interests.
Likewise, consider the view that a lawyer should seek to be a "mouthpiece"
for her client.46 This idea may advance human dignity under the right circum-
stances,4 7 but it can also sound in loyalty. Acting as a mouthpiece for someone is
ultimately a way of seeking to advance one of their goals (or perhaps several of
their goals), and it is readily subsumed within a loyalty that involves advance-
ment of a beneficiary's best interests. When we succeed in our goals that can
contribute to our well-being more generally, and lawyers may perceive their task
in this way. This is not, on the other hand, the same thing as advancing some-
one's overall best interests, unless it happens that the lawyer is a mouthpiece for
41 See, e.g., Lionel Smith, "Contract, Consent, and Fiduciary Relationships," in Miller & Gold,
Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law, 135: "If the result of the interpretive exercise is the conclu-
sion that the powers are held managerially, the relationship is fiduciary. This means, first, that the
powers must be exercised in what the fiduciary believes are the best interests of the beneficiary."
42 For a helpful discussion of the non-legal context, see Keller, The Limits of Loyalty, 4.
43 See Woolley, "The Lawyer as Fiduciary."
44 Ibid., 315.
4'5 Ibid.
46 Cf. David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 69; Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
47 For a suggestion that the circumstances are limited to specific settings, see Wendel, "Should
Lawyers Be Loyal To Clients, The Law, or Both?," 18-19.
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statements that turn out to benefit her client overall in light of the various factors
that enter into a full account of human well-being. That result is contingent on
facts that cannot be assumed.
As these examples indicate, lawyer-client relationships, like a number of other
fiduciary relationships, have only a loose connection to advancement of a benefi-
ciary's best interests. It is not difficult to locate fiduciary loyalty obligations (or
interpretations of those obligations) that diverge from a best interests standard.
That divergence need not result from an internal constraint, given that an un-
constrained loyalty obligation may simply call for advancement of something
other than best interests (e.g., advancement of a client's goals as she understands
them). Nonetheless, where divergence from a best interests approach does result
from the existence of internal constraints, this ought not to be problematic in fi-
duciary settings. Fiduciary law is already quite open to the idea of a fiduciary's
pursuing something other than a beneficiary's best interests. Recognition of in-
ternal constraints may instead put added pressure on the viability of fiduciary
theories that insist on a best interests standard of loyalty; such theories may need
reconsidering.
V. The Significance for Legal Reasoning
There is, however, another possibility that bears mention, and this is the possibil-
ity that the internal/external distinction does not much matter at the level of
legal reasoning. Assume one accepts that internally constrained loyalties are fea-
tures of both legal and extra-legal loyalty, at least for some relationships. I have
attempted above to show that this is a realistic conceptual possibility. Even if we
begin from that standpoint, it might appear that internal constraints in legal
contexts are largely a consequence of courts imposing these constraints based on
external concerns such as social policy. In other words, the internal constraints
on fiduciary loyalty may originate in much the same way that external con-
straints do, and with roughly the same content in each case. They may be the
product of similar reasoning, with similar consequences.
To make this concern more concrete, assume that a lawyer's loyalty obligations
engage lawyers in the endeavor of acting as a client's "mouthpiece." Such loyalty
obligations may be constrained by a requirement that the lawyer advance the
rule of law.48 If legal systems recognize a rule of law-based constraint, they might
do so because courts think something external to the lawyer's loyalty obligations
to her client should take precedence over those loyalty obligations. On the other
hand, legal systems might instead find that rule of law constraints on the lawyer's
mouthpiece role are internal to the loyalty that the lawyer owes her client. One
might nonetheless think the distinction is trivial. If a court adopts the latter
viewpoint but does so based on system-wide policy concerns, does it really mat-
ter if the resulting rule of law constraint is taken to be an internal constraint?
48 See Gardner, "The Twilight of Legality," 15-16.
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Isn't the policy analysis effectively the same as it would be if it were an external
constraint?
The policy analysis might be similar in either case, but note that the expressive
consequences might diverge. Lawyers may approach rule of law constraints and
similar requirements differently when they take them to be internal to the loyalty
they owe their clients, and they may look to the language in judicial opinions,
statutes, or regulations for guidance on the content and scope of their loyalty
obligations. If courts indicate that a constraint is an internal constraint, this may
alter the manner in which fiduciaries internalize that constraint and it may ul-
timately affect the extent of their compliance. Fiduciary law is often thought to
have a distinctive moral language, and this moral language may build on an in-
ternal constraint approach in a different way (and perhaps in a more coherent
way) than otherwise. Where the law selects an internal constraints option in
describing fiduciary loyalty, it could impact how fiduciaries respond to their
obligations.
Yet there is also a further point to bear in mind: many internal constraints on
loyalty can be elaborated by means of a judicial focus on the fiduciary relation-
ship at issue. When this happens, the internal constraint on a fiduciary's loyalty
may be derived from a court's interest in the values and concepts that underpin
that fiduciary's loyalty to her client rather than through a judicial reflection on
external policy considerations. An internal constraint will then result from a very
different type of legal reasoning even in cases where the content of the constraint
is the same regardless of its internal or external status.
Moreover, there is cause to think that differences in legal reasoning that lead
to an internal constraint can be desirable. Suppose that a court recognizes an ob-
ligation to advance the rule of law-and a corresponding constraint on a lawyer's
loyalty to her client-as an internal constraint. Suppose, however, that the court
reaches this conclusion not by figuring out whether the legal system as a whole
would be better off if this were an internal constraint. Instead, our hypothetical
court reaches this conclusion based on its understanding of what gives the
lawyer-client relationship its distinctive features and justification, of what makes
that relationship a fiduciary relationship, and of what kind of loyalty fits within
that fiduciary relationship. Even if the legal outcome (an internal constraint on
loyalty) is identical to the outcome reached through an externally focused policy
analysis, the pathway to that outcome differs in potentially valuable ways.
For example, if courts are reasoning from a given loyalty-centered relation-
ship's value for its participants, reasoning based on that relationship's objectives,
or reasoning based on a given loyalty obligation's contours, then they are con-
cerned with the micro-level of interpersonal relationships. Many of the concepts
that apply in such local, small-scale settings are modular-that is, they carve
away context in a manner that imposes less severe information burdens.4 9 To the
extent courts recognize internal loyalty constraints by assessing fiduciary
4 See generally Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, "Sizing Up Private Law," University of
Toronto Law Journal (forthcoming, 2020) (discussing the import of modular conceptual structures
at the micro-level of private law reasoning).
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relationships and concepts, they may largely bypass the intricacies of system-level
or even large-scale institutional policy analysis. The advantages to this approach
involve something different from expressive effects. A benefit to this approach is
that it can substantially limit information and delineation costs.50
To be sure, the particular legal reasoning that leads courts to an internal loy-
alty constraint need not be especially important, but it could be. At times, the
pathway to a legal result is significant, and not merely the result itself. This paper
does not draw a firm conclusion regarding the empirical puzzles involved in
assessing such questions. What I hope to suggest is that internal constraints are
not merely different in origin from external constraints; the reasoning that leads
to their recognition may be distinctive as well. Whether it is overall worthwhile
to adopt internal constraints for a given type of fiduciary loyalty will depend on
the loyalty at issue, the nature of the constraint, and the context in which it
applies. Whether courts should recognize internal constraints through wide-
ranging policy analysis or through analysis of a particular fiduciary relationship
and its conception of loyalty likewise hinges on the context and relationships at
stake.
VI. Conclusion
The constraints on a lawyer's fiduciary loyalty obligations may be understood as
internal features of those very obligations. For example, it could be that an obli-
gation to advance the rule of law-even where this constrains advancement of
the client's interests-is internal to the loyalty that a lawyer owes a client. Such
constraints may also be understood as external constraints resulting from a dual
fiduciary commission. It is a separate question whether one approach is more de-
sirable than the other, and a fiduciary relationship could even adopt both
approaches simultaneously. Even so, it plausibly could be valuable for loyalty
constraints to be incorporated into the loyalty that a lawyer owes to his or her
client. This paper considers the implications of the latter view.
The reasons to care about these distinctions are several. One basic reason is
that the fiduciary obligations of lawyers may be elaborated differently if lawyers
are taken to be public fiduciaries (a view which is often implicit in the dual com-
mission approach). It is wise to be cautious about colonization of private law
institutions by public law analysis.51 Another reason is that internal constraints
on fiduciary loyalty may result in greater compliance with the underlying loyalty
duties at issue (or perhaps with the constraints themselves). And a further reason
is that adopting internal constraints on loyalty will impact how certain categories
of fiduciary relationship are understood more generally.
If internal constraints are recognized, the loyalties owed by lawyers to their cli-
ents may show a complexity similar to the loyalties owed by other fiduciaries,
50 Note also that the manner in which courts describe loyalty obligations may also impact the
pathways of judicial reasoning in other ways. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, "A Cognitive Theory of
Fiduciary Relationships," Cornell Law Review 85 (2000): 777.
51 Cf. Merrill, "Private and Public Law," (describing an expansion of the public law side).
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such as corporate directors. Lawyers may then owe a complex loyalty that brings
several strands of loyalty obligations together into a whole. Any fiduciary that
must show obedience to instructions is already demonstrating something differ-
ent from a straightforward best interests-centered loyalty. Yet, given the many
private and public law concerns that arise in lawyer-client contexts, it should not
surprise us if the loyalties that lawyers owe are especially intricate. Lawyers are
subject to constraints on their loyalty that are unique to the lawyer-client con-
text. Those constraints could be, and perhaps even should be, seen as internal
features of that loyalty. Whether internal constraints are in fact desirable requires
further analysis, but this possibility merits a closer look.
